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I. Introduction
he 1990s were characterized by substantial financial sector 
consolidation across a large number of industrialized 
countries. This consolidation included within-industry and 
within-country consolidation as well as cross-industry (for 
example, banking and insurance) and cross-border consolida-
tion. In addition to mergers and acquisitions, there was a 
substantial increase in joint ventures and strategic partnerships 
between financial sector firms. The number of these looser 
affiliations increased especially rapidly in recent years.
In response to this ongoing transformation of the financial 
landscape, the Group of Ten (G-10) undertook a study of 
financial sector consolidation.1 The resulting report, produced 
by the G-10’s Task Force on the Impact of Financial Consolida-
tion on Monetary Policy (Group of Ten 2001) includes an 
analysis of the patterns and causes of consolidation in different 
sectors and countries. The report also evaluates the possible 
effects of consolidation, both in the past and going forward, in 
a number of important policy areas, including supervision, 
efficiency and competition, payments systems, and monetary 
policy. 
At the outset, those organizing the study thought that 
consolidation could have significant implications for the 
conduct and effectiveness of monetary policy (Ferguson 2001, 
p. 6). Consolidation could affect monetary policy by 
influencing the implementation of policy, the monetary 
transmission mechanism, or the environment for policy 
(including, for example, the liquidity and volatility of financial 
markets or the effects of difficulties at large institutions). 
However, the report concludes that the effects of consolidation 
on monetary policymaking have generally been very modest 
thus far, and that consolidation is unlikely to pose significant 
problems going forward (Group of Ten 2001, Chapter 4). 
The next section provides some background on financial 
sector—and especially banking industry—consolidation in 
recent years. Section III summarizes the G-10 report on 
consolidation and monetary policy, laying out the reasons why 
one might expect consolidation to have effects on monetary 
policymaking, the evidence gathered by the task force, and the 
conclusions reached. Section IV offers some possible implica-
tions of the report for U.S. policymakers; Section V concludes.
II. Consolidation and Banking 
Industry Concentration
The financial sector consolidation of recent years has been 
driven by a number of factors, including technological 
advances, deregulation, globalization of financial markets, and 
increased pressure from shareholders.2 This consolidation has 
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been accomplished through mergers and acquisitions as well 
as by joint ventures and strategic alliances. Such ventures and 
alliances are arrangements between firms allowing each to 
remain autonomous while also engaging in a “new business 
arrangement to achieve predetermined objectives” (Group of 
Ten 2001, p. 41). These looser links may be particularly useful 
when differences in language, regulation, corporate culture, or 
expectations make a formal merger either too expensive or 
prohibitively risky. They may also allow firms to move more 
gradually toward a merger (Group of Ten 2001, p. 32).
As shown in Table 1, the pace of financial sector 
consolidation picked up considerably over the past decade. The 
number and dollar volume of financial sector mergers and 
acquisitions increased rapidly over the 1990s. The bulk of these 
transactions—84 percent by dollar volume—reflected mergers 
within a single industry, and an even larger percentage reflected 
mergers of firms in the same country. The number of joint 
ventures and strategic alliances, while considerably smaller 
than the number of mergers and acquisitions, also expanded 
greatly over the course of the decade, with particularly fast 
growth recently. As one might expect, the fraction of joint 
ventures and strategic alliances accounted for by cross-border 
deals has been considerably higher than the comparable share 
of mergers and acquisitions. Such arrangements have been 
particularly common in Europe and the Pacific Rim (Group 
of Ten 2001, p. 41). 
Mergers and acquisitions among securities and banking 
firms are likely to have the largest impact on the conduct of 
monetary policy because the resulting reduction in the number 
and increase in the size of such firms could have important 
effects in financial and banking markets. Within the financial 
sector, the banking industry has accounted for the substantial 
majority—more than 60 percent by dollar volume—of the 
merger and acquisition activity, and these transactions have 
had a notable effect on industry concentration in many 
countries (Group of Ten 2001, p. 338). Table 2 shows the share 
of the domestic deposit market accounted for by the top five 
banks in each of the listed countries in 1990 and in 1998.3 Most 
countries saw a considerable rise in industry concentration, as 
measured by the change in the share of the top five banks, over 
Table 1
Financial Sector Consolidation in the 1990s
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
Mergers and Acquisitions by Number of  Transactions
Total 324 549 616 682 773 856 842 901 874 887 7,304
Within-border 266 481 556 622 695 740 742 782 741 766 6,391
Cross-border 58 68 60 60 78 116 100 119 133 121 913
Within-industry 252 448 517 578 642 692 677 722 716 684 5,928
Cross-industry 72 101 99 104 131 164 165 179 158 203 1,376
Mergers and Acquisitions by Dollar Volume (Billions of Dollars)
Total 38.0 38.2 38.4 65.3 53.4 151.6 97.0 293.0 495.1 353.2 1,623.1
Within-border 30.1 37.0 34.9 59.7 47.3 136.6 80.2 260.1 462.1 293.2 1,441.3
Cross-border 7.9 1.2 3.4 5.6 6.1 15.0 16.8 32.9 33.0 59.9 181.8
Within-industry 24.2 33.4 32.6 58.6 48.7 139.4 86.4 247.6 379.2 319.9 1,370.1
Cross-industry 13.8 4.8 5.7 6.7 4.7 12.2 10.6 45.4 115.9 33.2 253.0
Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances by Number of  Transactions
Total 119 149 123 129 211 326 165 344 718 721 3,005
Within-border 46 59 73 82 133 220 92 223 434 435 1,797
Cross-border 73 90 50 47 78 106 73 121 284 286 1,208
Source: Group of Ten (2001, pp. 335, 403).
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the decade. Consolidation appears to have been most rapid in 
Belgium, Canada, France, and Sweden, where the domestic 
deposit market share rose about 20 percentage points. The 
United States and Italy also posted substantial gains. By 
contrast, consolidation in Australia and Germany was very 
modest, and in Japan and the United Kingdom, concentration 
actually declined.4 
III. Summary of the G-10 Findings on 
Consolidation and Monetary 
Policy5
The G-10 task force considered the possible effects 
consolidation could have for monetary policymakers in three 
areas: policy implementation, the monetary transmission 
mechanism, and the policy environment. In evaluating these 
possible effects, the task force examined the existing literature; 
conducted a survey of staff at the central banks of the G-10 
countries, Australia, and Spain; and interviewed staff at those 
central banks. 
Possible Effects of Consolidation
In general, the implications of consolidation for monetary 
policymaking are ambiguous. The effects of consolidation 
depend on the initial situation in the financial markets, the 
reasons for the consolidation, the form that the consolidation 
takes, the speed at which the consolidation occurs, and the 
institutional and regulatory arrangements in the country where 
the consolidation happens. Thus, of the issues discussed below, 
the one that is most pertinent in a particular case will depend 
on a variety of factors. 
Possible Effects on the Implementation of Policy
Consolidation could affect the implementation of policy either 
by influencing the operation of the market for central bank 
balances directly or by changing the behavior of the 
counterparties for central bank monetary policy operations. 
The market for central bank balances could become less 
efficient if consolidation reduces the number of firms 
participating in the market and the level of competition falls as 
a result (perhaps owing to regulatory or technological barriers 
to entry). Even if consolidation does not affect the level of 
competition in the market, it could have an effect on the 
operation of the market if large firms’ behavior—for example, 
the aggressiveness with which they manage their central bank 
balances—differs from that of smaller firms. The effects of such 
differences on the operation of the market are not necessarily 
clear cut, however. For example, smaller buffers of excess 
balances might boost volatility, but improved management of 
reserves positions and better access to credit could reduce 
volatility. By reducing the value of interbank payments, 
consolidation might also reduce the liquidity of the market for 
central bank balances, which could increase market volatility 
and impair the reallocation of central bank balances across 
depository institutions. Such effects might make it more 
difficult for a central bank to achieve its targeted level of the 
policy rate. 
Consolidation could also affect the implementation of 
monetary policy by reducing the number of counterparties for 
monetary policy operations. Such a reduction could make 
these operations less competitive, thereby allowing some 
counterparties to make profits at the expense of the central 
bank, other counterparties, and firms not participating in the 
operations. It could also lead to greater uncertainty about the 
likely effects of operations on the policy interest rate. The size 
of these effects in a particular case would presumably depend 
Table 2
Banking Sector Concentration
Share of the Top Five Banks in Domestic Deposits 
Percent
Country 1990 1998 Change
Australia 72.1 73.9 1.8
Belgium 48.0 66.7 18.7
Canada 60.2 77.7 17.5
France 51.9 70.2 18.3
Germany 17.1 18.8 1.7
Italy 25.9  a 39.3 13.4   a
Japan 31.8 30.9 -0.9
Netherlands 73.7 81.7 8.0
Spain 38.3 47.2  b 8.9  b
Sweden 62.0 84.0 22.1
Switzerland 53.2 57.8  b 4.6  b
United Kingdom 43.7 35.2 -8.3
United States 11.3 26.2 14.9
Source: Group of Ten (2001, p. 447). 
a Share is for 1992, change is for 1992-98.
b Share is for 1997, change is for 1990-97.4 Financial Consolidation and Monetary Policy
on the regulatory environment, the structure of the central 
bank’s monetary policy operations, and other features of the 
market for central bank deposits.
Possible Effects on the Transmission Mechanism
In addition to its possible effects on the implementation of 
policy, consolidation could affect the monetary transmission 
mechanism linking movements in the central bank’s policy rate 
to the real economy. The nature of these effects would depend 
on the characteristics of the transmission mechanism.
In the simplest case, the transmission mechanism might be 
well represented by the conventional interest rate or “money” 
channel of monetary policy transmission. In that case, financial 
sector consolidation could affect the impact of changes in 
monetary policy by influencing the pass-through of changes in 
the central bank’s policy rate to other market rates. For 
example, the arbitrage that transmits changes in the central 
bank’s policy rate to other market rates and to asset prices more 
broadly could be weakened if consolidation reduced the 
liquidity or increased the volatility of the market for central 
bank deposits. The resulting changes in the pass-through of the 
policy rate to asset prices could involve either the speed or 
degree of pass-through. Alternatively, the speed of pass-
through might be increased by consolidation, because larger 
institutions operating in many asset markets could make 
arbitrage between markets more efficient than it would be with 
smaller and more fragmented firms.
Other effects are possible if the transmission mechanism 
includes an active “credit channel” owing to capital market 
imperfections. There are at least two types of models with 
such credit channels: those focusing on the informational role 
that banks may play in financial markets and those focusing 
on the role that collateral can play in reducing information 
problems. Models with a “bank-lending” channel assume that 
some borrowers require specialized lending services, such as 
screening or monitoring, that only banks are able to provide, 
and so bonds are not a perfect substitute for bank loans. 
Moreover, banks are assumed to find it difficult—perhaps 
because of regulations, capital market imperfections, or 
investor concerns about the banks’ financial health—to 
offset declines in transaction deposits with increases in 
other liabilities without paying a substantially higher price. 
Under these assumptions, the interest rate on bank loans 
would generally not be equal to the rate on bonds, and 
monetary policy could have effects on spending through its 
effects on the rate charged on bank loans as well as through 
market rates.6 
Large banks likely have better access to markets for managed 
liabilities than do smaller banks because of reduced informa-
tion costs and the smaller relative importance of fixed costs. As 
a result, an increase in the share of the banking industry 
accounted for by large banks owing to consolidation could 
dampen the impact of tighter monetary policy on the supply of 
bank loans, thereby reducing the size of its effect on the real 
economy. Similarly, if consolidation leads to stronger banks 
taking over weaker ones, then a larger share of the industry 
could be accounted for by banks with access to markets for 
managed liabilities, again dampening the effects of tighter 
policy on output through this channel. 
A second strain of the credit channel literature has focused 
on the possible effects of changes in monetary policy on a 
borrower’s financial condition and creditworthiness. In this 
“balance-sheet channel” of monetary policy, collateral plays a 
crucial role in the lending process.7 In the conventional interest 
rate view of the transmission mechanism, collateral is not an 
issue because debt contracts are implicitly assumed to be 
costlessly enforceable. However, if enforcement is costly, then 
lenders may demand collateral for some loans, and, as a result, 
some borrowers may be constrained by the value of the 
collateral that they can provide. In this case, if tighter policy 
reduces the value of collateral, then borrowers that have to 
provide collateral will not be able to borrow as much and are 
likely to cut back on spending. 
The effect of consolidation on the balance-sheet channel is 
not clear. On the one hand, consolidation could result in 
financial institutions that are better able to afford increased 
investment in technologies used to assess borrower risk. In that 
case, fewer borrowers might be required to provide collateral, 
thereby weakening the balance-sheet channel. On the other 
hand, the purchase of a small, local institution by a larger, 
nonlocal one could lead to the loss of some institutional 
knowledge about the creditworthiness of local borrowers. In 
that case, consolidation might imply an increase in the use of 
collateral, thereby strengthening the balance-sheet channel.
Possible Effects on the Policy Environment
In addition to its effects on policy implementation and 
transmission, consolidation might change the economic and 
financial environment in which monetary policy decisions are 
made. Consolidation could enhance the financial linkages 
across both markets and countries, thereby increasing the size 
and speed by which shocks are transmitted. For example, if 
consolidation yields larger financial firms with operations in a 
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in one market might, by reducing the capital of such firms, 
cause them to reduce their activity in other markets. The 
resulting decline in liquidity could cause prices to decline in 
those markets, whereas they would not have been much 
affected before consolidation took place. Similarly, cross-
border mergers may allow shocks to foreign economies to have 
larger effects on domestic financial markets than would have 
been the case before such mergers occurred. However, because 
the larger firms would presumably be better diversified, they 
might also be better able to absorb shocks. In that case, the 
effects in the market where the shock originated might be 
reduced, and the effects in other markets could be fairly small 
except in the event of a very large shock. 
Consolidation could also affect the liquidity and volatility of 
financial markets. Some theoretical models suggest that a 
decrease in the number of market makers could trim bid-ask 
spreads, for example, by reducing the impact of informed 
traders on the profits of market makers (see Dennert [1993]). 
However, empirical work indicates that a reduction in the 
number of market makers appears to lead to a widening of 
spreads, likely reflecting changes in the degree of competition 
(see, for example, Wahal [1997]).8 Such effects would be 
compounded if differences in the outlook among the 
remaining firms decline at times because their models and 
trading strategies converge.9 However, consolidation could 
increase market depth because the resulting larger firms might 
be more willing and able to take larger positions when market 
making. Moreover, if consolidation led to a more rapid 
adjustment of asset prices to changes in fundamentals—
perhaps because larger firms were better able to afford the 
analysis of asset values—its effects could be beneficial even if it 
resulted in increased volatility. 
Consolidation could cause problems for monetary 
policymakers by altering the behavior of indicator variables, 
such as interest rate spreads and monetary and credit 
aggregates, making it more difficult for central bankers to 
evaluate the appropriate stance of monetary policy at least for 
a time. Clearly, if consolidation has a significant effect on the 
transmission of shocks to financial markets, then it could affect 
the size or timing of moves in interest rate spreads or other 
market-based indicators. Similarly, if consolidation affects 
financial market volatility or liquidity, such measures could 
also become more volatile or less accurate. Alternatively, to the 
extent that the large banks resulting from consolidation have 
different funding or investment patterns than their smaller 
predecessors, consolidation could affect the behavior of 
monetary or credit aggregates. For example, because larger 
banks have better access to markets for managed liabilities, 
consolidation might cause a reduction in narrow monetary 
aggregates that do not include such liabilities.
Finally, the G-10 report notes that consolidation could 
foster the development of larger and more complex financial 
firms. The failure of such firms could be more difficult for the 
authorities to manage in an orderly fashion.10 Difficulties at 
such firms could also present central banks with challenges in 
terms of both liquidity provision and the possible need to ease 
the stance of monetary policy in response to their potential 
effects on the real economy. 
Evidence from the G-10 Study
To evaluate these possible effects of financial sector 
consolidation on monetary policymaking, the G-10 task force 
examined the pertinent existing literature, and gathered data 
from the central banks in the study nations through a survey 
and interviews. 
Evidence on Policy Implementation
To learn about the effects of consolidation on the implementa-
tion of monetary policy, the task force conducted a survey of 
central bankers involved in these operations. The survey asked 
about the actual and expected future effects of consolidation on 
the market for central bank balances, on the markets in which 
the central banks conduct monetary policy operations, and on 
other monetary policy issues. A majority of the central banks 
indicated that the number of firms participating actively in the 
market for central bank balances had declined over the past ten 
years as a result of financial sector consolidation, with some 
reporting a substantial decline. A similar share of the central 
banks expected consolidation to reduce the number of active 
participants further over the next ten years. Nonetheless, the 
number of active participants was generally thought to be well 
above the level deemed necessary for the market to operate 
efficiently. Even allowing for the expected decline in market 
participation over the next decade, the number of participants 
was still expected to be sufficient. In addition, the central 
bankers generally indicated that the behavior of firms in the 
market for central bank balances had not changed significantly 
as a result of consolidation.
The survey produced similar results regarding the effects of 
consolidation on the conduct of monetary policy operations. 
Nearly half of the central banks noted that consolidation had 
reduced the number of firms serving as counterparties for such 
operations over the past ten years. However, a number of the 
respondents suggested that other factors might have 
contributed to the declines. A majority indicated that they 6 Financial Consolidation and Monetary Policy
expected a further decline in the number of counterparties over 
the next ten years. However, as in the case of the market for 
central bank reserves, the number of counterparties was 
generally viewed as sufficient to ensure the efficient conduct 
of operations.
Not surprisingly, given their view that consolidation had 
not significantly affected the implementation of policy, few of 
the central banks had taken any actions or made any changes in 
operating procedures in response. Although a number of them 
reported changes in operating procedures in advance of Stage III 
of Economic and Monetary Union, these changes were not 
made in response to consolidation. Some suggested that, if the 
number of participants in monetary policy operations fell to an 
unacceptable level, the central banks would take action to 
ensure that operations remained efficient. Indeed, the Swiss 
National Bank noted that changes had been made to operating 
procedures, partly in response to consolidation. The changes 
included the introduction of repo operations, which make it 
easier for smaller institutions to participate. It also noted 
changes in eligibility criteria, which allow foreign institutions 
to participate in operations. 
The continued contestability of key markets and the 
introduction of the euro are two common reasons given to 
explain why consolidation had not been an important factor in 
the implementation of monetary policy in many of these 
countries.  Some of the central banks emphasized that it was 
not just the number of participants in key markets that 
mattered, but also their behavior in those markets. Although 
this behavior could presumably depend on a variety of factors, 
it was pointed out that low barriers to entry could, by ensuring 
that markets were contestable, constrain the ability of large 
firms to exploit market power. Moreover, in the euro area, 
several central banks noted that the advent of the new currency 
had more than offset the effects of consolidation. They argued 
that money markets in the euro-area countries had become 
integrated, so the number of participants in the market for 
central bank deposits should now be seen as the euro-area total, 
rather than the number domiciled in individual countries. 
Similarly, the appropriate number of counterparties to 
consider was the number for all of the euro-area central banks.
Evidence on the Monetary Transmission 
Mechanism
The G-10 report finds little evidence that consolidation affects 
the money channel of monetary policy transmission. Empirical 
studies of the effects of concentration on the pass-through of 
changes in policy rates to other interest rates are inconclusive. 
A few central banks indicated that consolidation could increase 
the size and speed of pass-through, but such effects were 
generally thought to be small. 
Although the academic literature on the importance of the 
credit channels of monetary policy is fairly ambiguous, there is 
some work suggesting that differences in financial structure 
across countries can affect the impact of changes in monetary 
policy on the real economy. For example, Cecchetti (2001) 
considers the relationship between the sizes of countries’ 
monetary policy multipliers and an index of indicators of 
financial structure that one would expect to be related to the 
strength of the bank-lending channel. The variables he includes 
in his index are measures of the importance of bank financing 
for firms, banking industry health, and banking sector 
concentration. These last two categories could be affected by 
consolidation. As one might expect if variation in the bank-
lending channel were important, his results suggest that the 
effects of monetary policy on output are larger in countries 
with less healthy and more fragmented banking systems and in 
which firms are relatively dependent on banks for financing. 
Taking another approach, de Bondt (2000) estimates models of 
bank lending in several European countries, finding evidence 
of a bank-lending channel in some of them. He then tries to 
capture possible macroeconomic effects of the bank-lending 
and credit channels of policy by adding variables related to 
such channels to vector error-correction models of the 
European economies. His results suggest that the bank-lending 
and balance-sheet channels are operative in some cases, 
providing the possible scope for consolidation to influence the 
transmission mechanism in those countries. 
The G-10 task force conducted interviews with central bank 
staff involved in the monetary policy process to find out if 
consolidation had affected the monetary transmission 
mechanism. These interviews also focused on the effects of 
consolidation on the operation of financial markets and on the 
interpretation of information variables. Some of the central 
banks indicated that consolidation was too recent a phenome-
non for its effects to be clearly evident. Nonetheless, those 
interviewed generally reported that consolidation had little 
effect on the monetary transmission mechanism. Where 
changes in the transmission mechanism had occurred, they 
were thought to be fairly minor, and the role that consolidation 
had played was difficult to assess because it had been 
accompanied by changes in regulations and technologies, 
increased competition, and globalization. 
When asked about the different channels of transmission, 
most central bankers were unsure of the importance of the 
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assuming that they were active, there was little evidence that 
these channels had been affected by consolidation. For 
example, most central banks had not seen a change in the 
distributional impact of monetary policy changes, which one 
might expect if consolidation were influencing the credit 
channels of monetary policy. 
Although most central banks said that consolidation had 
not significantly affected the monetary transmission 
mechanism in the past, they were less sure of its effect going 
forward, especially if the pace of consolidation accelerated for a 
time. However, there was considerable uncertainty about what 
that effect likely would be. 
Evidence on the Policy Environment
The central bank staff members interviewed generally did not 
consider the effects of consolidation on the operation of 
financial markets to be significant. As in the case of the 
implementation of policy, the effects of consolidation in the 
euro area had likely been offset by the introduction of the euro 
and the subsequent integration of financial markets. Moreover, 
the central banks pointed out that if consolidation did lead to 
higher volatility and lower liquidity than is compatible with 
competitive markets, then, so long as barriers to entry 
remained low, one would expect new entrants to offset the 
effects of consolidation over time. Nonetheless, staff at the 
Bank of Japan did express some concern that the substantial 
consolidation among large firms that is expected in that 
country might have an effect on market operations there. 
Consolidation also does not appear to have had an 
important effect on the information content of indicator 
variables. Because the impact of consolidation on the operation 
of financial markets was generally viewed as minimal, the 
effects of consolidation on indicator variables based on asset 
prices or market interest rates have presumably been 
unimportant. Although some of the central banks indicated 
that developments in the financial sector had reduced the 
predictability of the monetary aggregates, they generally did 
not attribute the difficulties to consolidation. The central banks 
that did report an effect of consolidation did not view it as 
having been very significant. Nonetheless, a few of the central 
banks thought that consolidation could have more substantial 
effects on monetary aggregates in the future, especially if the 
pace of consolidation picked up. 
Finally, it was noted that financial difficulties at one of the 
larger and more complicated financial institutions resulting 
from consolidation could pose challenges to central banks in 
terms of both their lender-of-last-resort and monetary 
policy roles. On the lender-of-last-resort side, the central 
bank would have to decide upon the appropriate magnitude 
and duration of lending to the institution while taking into 
account the possible moral-hazard effects of such lending. 
Indeed, some of those interviewed emphasized that 
investors should bear in mind that even very large 
institutions would not necessarily receive emergency 
liquidity assistance in all cases. On the monetary policy side, 
the respondents noted that policy would remain focused on 
the central bank’s goals for output and inflation and not be 
unduly influenced by the possible effects of policy on the 
financial position of the troubled firm. It was also pointed 
out that if policy were eased in such a situation to address 
the effects of financial market stresses on the real economy, 
policymakers would need to be ready to tighten policy again 
as conditions in financial markets improved. 
Conclusions of the Task Force
The G-10 report concludes that consolidation has generally not 
had important effects on monetary policymaking and that its 
effects going forward are likely to remain modest. Nonetheless, 
three possible lessons for policymakers are noted. First, 
sufficient consolidation could limit competition in key 
financial markets and might hamper central banks’ 
implementation of policy. Thus, central bankers should be 
ready to make necessary changes in regulations and procedures 
to address the effects of consolidation. 
Second, although central bankers generally did not think 
that consolidation had affected the monetary transmission 
mechanism, it should be noted that the difficulties associated 
with making such an assessment make it hard to rule out such 
an effect. Although regular assessments of the data may allow 
central banks to take any changes that do occur into account 
when setting policy, they should be ready to respond if 
evidence emerges of a change in the monetary transmission 
mechanism owing to consolidation. 
Third, although consolidation is not likely to greatly affect 
the operation of financial markets or the interpretation of 
information variables, it has fostered the creation of very large 
and complex financial firms, the failure of which could be 
difficult to manage. Financial difficulties at such a firm would 
require careful decisions by central banks on the appropriate 
level of lending and the possible need to ease monetary policy 
to cushion the macroeconomy from the financial market 
strains caused by the firm’s problems. 8 Financial Consolidation and Monetary Policy
IV. Implications for U.S. 
Policymakers
Given the large number of financial firms in the United States 
relative to many of the other countries studied, consolidation 
here seems less likely to have substantial effects on either the 
implementation or the transmission of monetary policy. 
However, consolidation could still influence the economic and 
financial environment in ways that policymakers would need 
to take into account. 
Effects on the Implementation of Policy and 
the Transmission Mechanism
Despite the cautions offered by the G-10 report, U.S. officials 
are unlikely to have difficulties implementing policy because of 
consolidation any time soon. The United States still has a huge 
number of banks and a relatively low level of industry 
concentration (Table 2). Moreover, participation in the market 
for central bank balances and monetary policy operations 
appears to be ample to support their efficient operation. 
Indeed, the evidence compiled by the G-10 task force suggests 
that central banks can successfully implement policy even with 
a very concentrated financial sector (Group of Ten 2001, 
p. 226).
It also seems unlikely that consolidation will have a 
significant effect on the monetary transmission mechanism in 
the United States. U.S. financial markets are already very 
sophisticated, and it does not seem likely that consolidation 
will have a significant impact on the speed at which changes in 
monetary policy are transmitted to asset prices. Evidence 
regarding the importance of the bank-lending channel in the 
United States is inconclusive.11 In any case, the channel is likely 
to be relatively less important in the United States than in most 
other industrial countries: although the United States 
continues to have a very large number of small banks, U.S. 
banks are very healthy and U.S. financial markets are well 
developed (Cecchetti 2001). Moreover, the government-
sponsored mortgage agencies—Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac—give even smaller banks the ability to securitize 
mortgages, and the Federal Home Loan Bank System provides 
such banks with access to funds outside their deposit bases.12 
Thus, the effects of consolidation—if any—on that channel 
should be fairly small. Similarly, the effects on the balance-
sheet channel are likely to be modest. As noted earlier, the effect 
of consolidation on the importance of collateral for lending is 
not clear a priori. In addition, banks do not have to be 
particularly large to take advantage of advances in the 
evaluation of borrower risk because credit scores are available 
from private vendors. 
Effects on the Policy Environment 
Two features of financial sector consolidation in the United 
States may have important implications for the policy 
environment. First, spurred by regulatory changes, including 
the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency 
Act of 1994, consolidation has resulted in greater geographical 
diversification of banking institutions. Second, mergers among 
the largest banking firms have resulted in the development of 
very large and complex institutions. Difficulties at such firms 
may have large effects in financial markets and on the real 
economy. 
Increased geographical diversification of banking firms 
should help to limit the effects of regional economic shocks. In 
Texas in the mid-1980s and in New England in the early 1990s, 
substantial shocks to the local economy had adverse effects on 
many banks in the affected regions. The deterioration in the 
banks’ balance sheets may have compounded the effects of the 
shocks, as banks reduced their lending activities in response to 
capital pressures.13 However, interstate consolidation should 
reduce this sort of “financial accelerator” because banks 
operating in a region hit by an adverse shock will be better 
diversified, owing to their operations in other regions. 
As noted in the G-10 report, financial difficulties at a large 
and complex financial firm could pose challenges for central 
banks in both their monetary policy and lender-of-last-resort 
roles (Group of Ten 2001, pp. 241-2). It is not clear whether 
consolidation has increased the riskiness of individual financial 
firms. However, consolidation may have increased the risks 
that a large and complex banking organization’s failure in the 
United States would be more difficult to resolve in an orderly 
manner than was the case in the past (Group of Ten 2001, 
p. 133). As a result, the stresses in financial markets caused by 
difficulties at such an organization—and their possible 
macroeconomic effects—may be more likely to require a 
monetary policy response. However, it is likely to be very 
difficult to judge the effects of such difficulties in advance 
because they would presumably depend in large part on the 
source of the firm’s problems, details of its positions, and 
investors’ assessments of the possible effects on other large 
financial firms. In practice, monetary policymakers will likely 
have to judge the appropriate stance of monetary policy by 
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evaluating the likely effects of changes in policy on the markets 
and on the real economy.
The increased difficulty in achieving an orderly wind-down 
of the largest firms reflects a number of factors. The first factor 
is simply a lack of experience with the failure of very large firms. 
The largest bank ever resolved by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was First Republic Bank Corp. 
in 1988, which had assets of $33 billion (or $49 billion in 2000 
dollars).14 By comparison, at the end of last year, there were ten 
U.S. bank holding companies with more than $100 billion in 
assets, and twenty-one with assets of more than $50 billion.15 
Moreover, the largest U.S. bank holding companies also have 
very large off-balance-sheet derivatives positions, and these 
positions have expanded very rapidly over the past decade 
(Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 2001, Table 4). 
 A second factor that may contribute to the increased 
difficulty of achieving an orderly resolution of the largest 
banking firms is the increased complexity of such institutions. 
These firms commonly have various lines of business 
conducted in a number of different legal entities, and their data 
systems are primarily for the management of business lines 
rather than legal entities (Group of Ten 2001, pp. 133-4).16 As 
a result, there may be complex intergroup transactions that 
would be difficult to unwind in the event of troubles at one of 
the legal entities. Moreover, different legal entities within the 
bank holding company can have different supervisors 
(including state insurance departments, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and one or more of the federal banking 
agencies), which would have to be coordinated in the event of 
difficulties at the firm. Indeed, the different supervisors might 
have different priorities in some cases (Group of Ten 2001, 
p. 135). 
Cross-border consolidation could compound the problems 
caused by difficulties at a major banking firm (Group of Ten 
2001, p. 242). For example, in the event the firm was operating 
internationally, it might not be clear which central bank should 
provide emergency liquidity assistance. Other complications 
may arise with regard to the closure of such an internationally 
active, large, and complex financial institution, owing to 
different approaches to bankruptcy across countries and 
possible efforts by some national authorities to liquidate as 
separate entities those portions of the institution within their 
jurisdiction. These issues are especially pointed because several 
of the largest U.S. banks have substantial activities abroad, and 
a number of large foreign banking firms have substantial 
operations in the United States.17 For example, about a third of 
the banking organizations in the Federal Reserve System’s 
supervisory program for large, complex banking organizations 
are foreign-based (DeFerrari and Palmer 2001, p. 55). 
Finally, legal changes following the thrift and banking 
troubles of the late 1980s and the early 1990s may also increase 
the complexity of some large bank resolutions. The Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 
(FDICIA) established guidelines for Federal Reserve discount- 
window lending to troubled institutions (12 U.S.C.§347b(b)). 
Lending in excess of the guidelines can make the Federal 
Reserve liable for a portion of any resulting increase in FDIC 
resolution costs. Although the financial penalties are not likely 
to be large, the guidelines would presumably subject such 
lending to additional scrutiny.18 FDICIA also generally 
requires the FDIC to resolve failing institutions at “least cost” 
to the deposit insurance funds (12 U.S.C.§ 1823(c)(4)). Since 
some large and complex banks have relatively low volumes of 
domestic deposits, liquidation might be accomplished at no 
cost to the insurance funds. Although that does not mean that 
liquidation would be required in such cases, it could make the 
choice of resolution method more complicated (Group of Ten 
2001, p. 134). The act provides for a “systemic risk exception” 
to least-cost resolution, but the process is fairly elaborate.19 
This exception has never been invoked, and so it is difficult to 
know under what circumstances it might be applied, and what 
alternative resolution method would be employed as a result. 
Even if the systemic risk exception were invoked, all creditors 
of the failing institution need not be repaid in full: the FDIC 
presumably would use the increased flexibility to address the 
systemic risks while undermining market discipline as little as 
possible (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2000, p. 36). 
V. Concluding Remarks
A final issue raised by the report—and not just for U.S. 
policymakers—is the apparent disagreement between the 
results of the G-10 task force interviews and the Committee on 
the Global Financial System (CGFS) report on the operation of 
financial markets in the fall of 1998 regarding the effects of 
consolidation on the operation of financial markets. The 
central bankers interviewed were virtually unanimous in 
reporting that consolidation had not influenced the volatility 
and liquidity of financial markets. By contrast, the CGFS report 
suggested that consolidation had affected the operation of 
financial markets, concluding that it was one of the “market 
mechanisms” that had contributed to the difficulties in 
financial markets at that time. The CGFS report states that 
“increasing concentration of activity among a few large global 
institutions that were active in many markets made the 
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dramatic. Because of the broad scope of their business dealings, 
decisions by some of these firms to reduce their exposure to 
risk . . . influenced the prices of many financial instruments” 
(1999, p. 14). 
One way to square these results is if the adverse effects of 
consolidation on the functioning of markets are only 
observable during periods of market turbulence, and the 
central bankers’ responses referred to more ordinary 
situations. It seems plausible that if, as a result of consolidation, 
there were only a few large firms trading actively in a particular 
market, the market might continue to operate well in normal 
times. However, the effects of a substantial shock in a particular 
financial market could be larger and more widespread as a 
result of consolidation because most large financial firms 
would be active in that market and they would be adversely 
affected by the shock and also because competitive pressures to 
act as a shock absorber for borrowers and traders during 
turbulent periods might be reduced (Group of Ten 2001, 
pp. 240-1). Another possibility is that in a more concentrated 
market, if a shock forced one firm to pull back sharply on its 
activities, then the resulting decline in market liquidity for the 
other firms would be relatively large. Therefore, the other firms 
might reduce their activities considerably, potentially leading 
to a substantial self-reinforcing decline in market liquidity, at 
least for a time.20 Thus, when considering the possible effects of 
difficulties at a large, complex financial firm, central banks 
might be well advised to take into account the possibility of a 
larger-than-expected deterioration in financial market 
performance. Endnotes
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1. The study’s working party was chaired by Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., 
Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System. The working party included finance and central bank staff 
from the G-10 countries, Australia, and Spain, as well as representa-
tives from the Bank for International Settlements, the European 
Central Bank, the European Commission, the International Monetary 
Fund, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD).
2. Further discussion of the causes of consolidation can be found in 
Group of Ten (2001, pp. 65-124). 
3. The G-10 report also provides concentration data for insurance 
firms. Increased concentration in the insurance industry, while 
significant in a few cases, does not appear to have been as widespread 
as in the banking industry (pp. 449-50). National concentration data 
for securities firms over the 1990s are not available, but concentration 
in worldwide debt and equity underwriting does not appear to have 
increased over the decade (p. 56). Nonetheless, some securities 
activities were quite concentrated at the end of the decade (p. 57).
4. However, concentration in Japan has increased considerably since, 
owing to mergers among large institutions (Group of Ten 2001, 
p. 58).
5. The material in this section is summarized from Group of Ten 
(2001, pp. 223-46). The chair of the Task Force on the Impact of 
Financial Consolidation on Monetary Policy was Alex Bowen of the 
Bank of England. The task force included staff members from the 
Bank of Canada, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, the Bank of Japan, the National Bank of Belgium, and the 
Bank of France, plus representatives from the OECD. Since the report 
includes a substantial amount of information, this summary 
necessarily reflects my views on which parts to emphasize. The 
interested reader should consult the report for additional information 
and a more nuanced view of some of the topics summarized.
6. A useful presentation is in Bernanke and Blinder (1988).
7. For example, see Bernanke and Gertler (1998).
8. Of course, even with a large number of market makers, collusion on 
bid-ask spreads may be possible. See Christie and Schultz (1994) and 
Christie et al. (1994) for analyses of Nasdaq spreads. 
9. This possibility is discussed in Committee on the Global Financial 
System (1999, p. 15).
10. The supervisory issues raised by such firms are discussed in Group 
of Ten (2001, pp. 125-222).
11. See, for example, Kashyap et al. (1993), Kashyap and Stein (2000), 
and Miron et al. (1994).
12. Indeed, the increased securitization of mortgages may have 
reduced the bank-lending channel of monetary policy considerably. 
Estrella (forthcoming) suggests that increases in securitization have 
been associated with a substantial decline in the sensitivity of U.S. 
output to changes in monetary policy. 
13. For a summary of the evidence on the link between bank capital 
and lending, see Sharpe (1995). 
14. Between April 1988 and July 1989, the FDIC resolved four large 
Texas banking organizations with combined assets of more than 
$65 billion, or about $100 billion in today’s dollars (Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation 1998, p. 33). Even taken together, however, 
these failures do not compare with the largest U.S. banking 
organizations today. At the time of its failure, the Bank of New 
England Corp. was somewhat smaller than First Republic Bank Corp. 
was at the time of its failure. However, the operations of the Bank of 
New England Corp. may have been more complex (Group of Ten 
2001, p. 133). 
15. Of course, the assets of the largest bank holding companies exceed 
those of the largest banks. Nonetheless, at the end of 2000, there were 
eight banks with assets of more than $100 billion and eighteen with 
assets of more than $50 billion. 
16. The development of very large and complicated banking 
organizations in the United States has led the Federal Reserve to 
develop and implement a program for the supervision of “large, 
complex banking organizations,” or LCBOs. In recent years, there 
have been twenty-five to thirty such organizations. For a description 
of these efforts, see DeFerrari and Palmer (2001).
17. See Houpt (1999) for a discussion of the foreign operations of U.S. 
banking firms as well as the U.S. operations of foreign banking firms.12 Financial Consolidation and Monetary Policy 
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18. Under the guidelines, the Federal Reserve can be liable for a 
portion of any resulting increase in FDIC resolution costs if the 
Federal Reserve lends for more than 60 days in any 120-day period to 
a depository institution that is undercapitalized (as defined in 
FDICIA) or has a “CAMELS” rating of 5. The same potential liability 
applies if the Federal Reserve lends to a critically undercapitalized
institution for more than five days after it becomes critically 
undercapitalized. The sixty-day limit can be waived for sixty days if the 
appropriate regulator or the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board 
provides written certification that the borrower is viable, as defined in 
FDICIA, or if the Board chooses to treat the institution as critically 
undercapitalized. The liability of the Federal Reserve Board is limited 
to the lesser of: the increase in FDIC resolution costs, the loss that the 
Federal Reserve would have sustained on increases in lending after the 
periods noted in FDICIA had such lending been unsecured, or the 
interest on the increased lending. 
19. Under the statute, the FDIC can employ a non-least-cost 
resolution method only if the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury (in 
consultation with the President) makes an explicit determination to 
that effect. To do so, the secretary must find that least-cost resolution 
would have “serious adverse effects on economic conditions or 
financial stability,” and that a more costly resolution method “would 
avoid or mitigate such adverse effects.” In addition, both the Federal 
Reserve Board and the FDIC Board must recommend, by two-thirds 
votes, that the systemic risk exception be invoked.
20. This sort of feedback of one firm’s activity on the desired level of 
activity of another firm is explored in Reinhart and Sack (2000, 
pp. 201-3).References
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